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BEYOND SKILLS TRAINING
STEPHEN WIZNER*
This article promotes a broad view of clinical legal education as hav-
ing a political and moral purpose that informs the field's intellectual
and skills-training functions. Consulting the history of the field, the
author demonstrates that the clinical approach to legal education has
always been rooted in a social justice mission. The author urges
clinical teachers not only to teach legal knowledge and lawyering
skills but also the value ofpursuing social justice. The author uses the
Yale clinical program to illustrate some of the ways in which clinical
legal educators can use client-centered legal services work to teach
students to reflect on and recognize the lawyer's responsibility to seek
social justice.
INTRODUCTION
In a provocative apologia offered on behalf of the Rutgers Con-
stitutional Litigation Clinic,l Frank Askin confesses that in three de-
cades of clinical teaching he has paid scant attention to issues of
clinical pedagogy and client-centered representation. Rather, he has
provided students an opportunity to participate with him in sophisti-
cated litigation dealing with, in his words, "exciting issues on the cut-
ting edges of federal and state constitutional doctrine."2
Askin contends that there should be more to clinical legal educa-
tion than skills-training focusing on the representation of individual
clients. He argues that clinical programs should offer students "a
practical vision of law as an instrument of social justice," and provide
students an opportunity "to have real social impact and create new
and better law."3
While I agree with Askin that the proper objective of clinical le-
gal education is to teach students about using law to pursue social
justice, I nevertheless disagree with his contention that complex con-
stitutionallitigation is the essential means for realizing that objective.
In my view client-centered legal services work is as important a way of
* William O. Douglas Clinical Professor of Law, Yale Law School. Jane Aiken, Dennis
Curtis, Jonathan Weiss, and Rachel Wizner made helpful suggestions that have enabled me
to clarify the position advanced in the following pages.
1 Frank Askin, A Law School Where Students Don't Just Learn the Law: They Help
Make the Law, 51 RUTGERS L. REv. 855 (1999).
2 /d. at 856.
3 [d.
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teaching about social justice as law reform litigation.
The law school clinic is a place where students should learn not
only the techniques of advocacy, but also the importance of advocacy
in helping individuals solve their problems, defend their rights, and
achieve their goals. Students can learn from this experience that legal
advocacy can make a real difference for real people, and may learn
from that experience that they should become active participants in
the struggle to extend the availability of legal services to the poor.
Assuming the role of advocate, under proper supervision by a
clinical teacher, can change a student's perspective about her client
and the world in which her client lives. It can even transform the stu-
dent's view of the world and lead her to identify with her client and
with others like her client. Serving as an advocate on behalf of a low-
income client under good supervision can deepen the student's under-
standing and compassion, and cause her to affirm the common hu-
manity she shares with her client and with others in her client's
position. This, in turn, can lead the student to see that the choice she
will make of which clients to represent as a lawyer, of whose interests
she will serve, is an ethical and moral choice. And ideally, the choice
she will make is to pursue social justice.
SOCIAL JUSTICE
The lack of access to justice for the "legally underprivileged"4 is a
growing problem. A national survey of economically disadvantaged
individuals conducted by the American Bar Association prior to re-
cent reductions and restrictions in government-funded legal services
programs found that 80% of the legal problems of the poor were han-
dled without any legal assistance.s Government funded legal services
programs have lost significant funding in recent years, and the availa-
bility of legal services for low-income clients has consequently become
even more scarce than when the ABA survey was conducted.
Recent restrictions on the types of cases legal services lawyers
can handle6 prohibit legal services lawyers from bringing class ac-
tions,7 representing families facing eviction from government-subsi-
dized housing because a family member has been accused of a drug
offense,S providing legal assistance to undocumented aliens,9 and en-
4 John S. Bradway, The Legally Underprivileged, 10 CAL. W. L. REV. 228 (1974).
5 See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N CONSORTIUM OF LEGAL SERVS. AND THE PUB., Two
NATIONWIDE SURVEYS: 1989 PILOT ASSESSMENTS OF THE UNMET LEGAL NEEDS OF THE
POOR AND OF THE PUBLIC GENERALLY 37 (1989).
6 The restrictions are set forth in the regulations of the Legal Services Corporation, 45
C.F.R. §§ 1600-99 (1997).
7 See id., § 1617.3.
8 See id., § 1633.3.
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gaging in other forms of legal advocacy on behalf of low-income indi-
viduals and groupS.lO
A recent survey conducted by The American Lawyer11 and re-
ported on the front page of the New York Times 12 has disclosed that
major law firms, in reaction to rising salaries, have reduced dramati-
cally their pro bono legal assistance to the poor.
The reductions in funding, restrictions on forms of advocacy, and
shrinkage of pro bono legal assistance have exacerbated what was al-
ready a crisis in access to justice for the poor.!3 The unavailability of
legal assistance for individual clients unable to afford to pay for it is a
social justice issue to which law school clinics can respond.
Still it is important to acknowledge Frank Askin's point that im-
pact litigation and group representation have the potential to address
broader social justice concerns related to the maldistribution of
wealth, power and rights in society. Representing groups in class ac-
tions, engaging in law reform litigation and supporting community or-
ganizing efforts are crucial to increasing the economic and political
power of the poor. Government-funded legal services programs are
prohibited from engaging in these activities. Here too, law school
clinics can assume some of the responsibility for doing so.
TEACHING SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE CLINIC
It has been a basic assumption of clinical legal education that stu-
dents are motivated to learn by being given the responsibility for as-
sisting real clients with their legal problems. As students come to
realize the reality of their clients' legal situation, and how important
legal representation is to the resolution of their clients' problems, they
become ever more conscious of their responsibility to the clients.
The student's feeling of personal responsibility in representing an
individual client can grow into a feeling of social responsibility for the
provision of legal services to the poor. When the student realizes that,
in all likelihood, the client would not have access to legal assistance
but for the law student and the clinic, her consciousness is raised. This
awakening to a sense of social responsibility, occurs when students
represent low-income clients who are seeking - or seeking to defend
9 See id., § 1626.3.
10 Legal Services lawyers had also been prevented from participating in legal efforts to
challenge or promote reforms in federal and state welfare programs, but the Supreme
Court recently overturned this restriction by a 5-4 decision on First Amendment grounds in
Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez, 2001 WL 193738 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2001).
11 THE AMERICAN LAWYER, July 2000.
12 N.Y. TIMES, August 17,2000, at 1.
13 See Symposium: Crisis in the Legal Profession: Rationing Legal Services for the Poor,
4 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 731 (1999).
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- basic benefits, liberty, or fairness. Therefore, providing legal repre-
sentation to low income clients, both individually and through group
representation, should be the basis of clinical practice and teaching.
There are important lessons about the role of law and lawyers, and
about social justice, to be learned from working on such cases.
The issue is not whether law school clinics should be handling law
reform cases or engaging in individual client-centered representation.
Both are important, and students can learn important lessons about
practicing law and about social justice from both types of cases. The
questions that need to be asked, and debated, are (1) whether law
students should be taught that lawyers ought to use law for good so-
cial purposes, and (2) if so, how that can be taught effectively. These
questions have little to do with whether law school clinics ought to
handle "big" cases or individual client cases.
Regardless of whether they are representing individual clients in
resolving time-limited legal problems, or are working on law reform
cases or class actions that extend over several semesters, many stu-
dents don't really believe that what they are doing has a moral pur-
pose. They see themselves as acquiring skills that they will need when
they go out to practice law, and not as participating in a struggle for
social justice.
If there is a real flaw in our clinical pedagogy it is that we have
failed to sustain and to pass on to our students the passion for social
justice that many of us had when we first started practicing and teach-
ing. My worry is that today's law students have become cynical about
the potential usefulness of law as a means for pursuing and achieving
social justice. Clinical legal educators have not succeeded in inculcat-
ing in their students the belief that many of us had when we came to
clinical teaching, that law is something that can be, and therefore
should be, used in the struggle for social justice.
Frank Askin may be correct in suggesting that excessive concern
with the teaching of lawyering skills and the nuances of attorney-client
relationships have distracted our attention and that of our students
from the social and political functions of law. I believe that the em-
phasis in clinical teaching on what I would call "micro-lawyering"
risks shortchanging both our students and our clients by narrowing
students' vision and stifling their passion and creativity. Focusing ex-
clusively, or primarily, on client-centered interviewing, counseling,
fact investigation, negotiation, and written and oral advocacy can fail
to nurture students' capacity for moral indignation at injustice in the
world, or to challenge and inspire them as lawyers to use what they
have learned to work for social justice.
Even clinicians who may not actually believe that skills training is
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or ought to be the primary objective of their teaching may have been
unwitting accomplices in perpetrating and perpetuating the "selling"
of clinical education as "skills-training." We may have felt ourselves
pushed by our law schools to describe our teaching in those modest
terms, but we must be careful not to buy into that characterization of
what we are about.
As clinical teachers we should engage with our students on a
deeper level than simply teaching them the craft of practicing law.
Our teaching must go beyond skills training. It is not enough for
clinical teachers to instruct students in the legal skills that are essential
to competent representation of clients. Nor is it sufficient to teach
them that they have an ethical duty to provide competent representa-
tion to clients.
We need to profess a social, political and moral agenda in our
teaching, an agenda that exposes students to the maldistribution of
wealth, power and rights in society, and that seeks to inculcate in them
a sense of their own ability and responsibility for using law to chal-
lenge injustice by assisting the poor and the powerless.14
In professing such an agenda in teaching the representation of
low-income clients, we as clinical teachers would not be doing any-
thing new. We would be returning to our roots.
THE FIRST THIRTY YEARS
Some thirty years ago William Pincus, the father of the clinical
legal education movement, identified the pursuit of justice as a pri-
mary educational value in clinical experience for law students.15
Clinical education, he argued, "can develop in the future lawyer a sen-
sitivity to malfunctioning and injustice in the machinery of justice and
other arrangements of society."'16 Pincus believed that law students
need "to learn and to recognize what is wrong with the society around
[them] - particularly what is wrong with the machinery of justice in
which [they are] participating and for which [they have] a special
responsibility."17
14 As one clinical teacher has expressed it:
If an I can do in law school is to teach students skills ungrounded in a sense of
justice then at best there is no meaning to my work, and at worst, I am contributing
to the distress in the world. I am sending more people into the community armed
with legal training but withdut a sense of responsibility for others or for the delivery
of justice in our society.
Jane Harris Aiken, Striving to Teach "Justice, Fairness and Morality," 4 CLIN. L. REv. 1,6
n.10 (1997).
15 Educational Values in Clinical Experience for Law Students, II CLEPR NEWSLET-
TERS, No.1, Sept., 1969.
16 Id.
17 Id.
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The founders of the clinical movement, responding to the social
ferment and legal rights explosion of the 1960's, envisioned clinical
legal education not only as a way of enriching legal education with
professional training, but as a means of stimulating law schools to at-
tend to the legal needs of the poor, and engaging students in the pur-
suit of social justice.
It was not surprising that the first generation of clinical teachers
came from the world of legal services, civil rights, and public interest
practice. They were social activist lawyers who had eschewed careers
in private practice in order to work for social and economic justice. It
was this orientation that they brought with them when they entered
clinical teaching.
In the early days of the clinical legal education movement, experi-
ential learning and skills training were thought of as pedagogical
means for enabling law students to transcend the limitations of tradi-
tional legal education. They were the means, not the end. The end
was to get students out of the classroom into the real world of law. In
the words of William Pincus, "students have been well insulated from
the more miserable facts of the administration or maladministration of
justice by being confined to the classroom and casebooks. "18
The three decades since William Pincus provided the initial con-
ceptual and financial impetus for the development of clinical legal ed-
ucation have witnessed the spread of clinical programs to virtually
every law school in the United States, making it the most significant
reform in American legal education since Langdell's invention of the
case method a century earlier.
As we survey the state of clinical legal education today, the con-
clusion is inescapable that many, if not most, law school clinics are not
designed to be laboratories for pursuing social justice and social re-
form. For a variety of reasons, some pedagogical, others having to do
with students' pragmatic concerns, clinical legal education has tended
to emphasize skills training and professional development over social
objectives.
Few law school clinics define themselves as advocates for social
justice, or include law reform litigation as a significant part of their
caseloads. Those clinics that limit their work to representation of indi-
vidual clients, in what legal service programs characterize as "service"
cases, tend not to select cases for their potential impact or to have an
explicit social justice agenda in their individual casework. As a conse-
18 William Pincus, Concepts of Justice and of Legal Education Today, in COUNCIL ON
LEGAL EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR LAW
STUDENTS: ESSAYS BY WILLIAM PINCUS 125, 131 (1980) (speech delivered at Order of the
Coif Dinner, Villanova Law School, January 15, 1971).
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quence, there exists an incomplete fit between clinical legal education
and the pursuit of social justice.19
The evidence on poor people's lack of access to justice suggests
that the majority of clinic students, when they enter the profession, do
not use what they learned in the law school clinic to provide legal
assistance to the poor or to challenge social and economic injustice.
The goal of instilling in law students the professional obligation of
providing legal assistance to the poor and of using law to effect social
change continues to be unrealized despite three decades of clinical
legal education.
It is fair to ask why this is so. Nearly all law school clinics provide
students the experience of supervised law practice on behalf of low-
income clients, and the opportunity for critical reflection about the
legal problems of the poor. Students cannot avoid seeing that, but for
their efforts, their clients would not have legal representation and
their clients' rights and interests would not be protected. And yet,
only a very small number of students who have participated in law
school clinics carry those lessons into practice to any significant
degree.
It may be that clinicians have failed to develop a pedagogy that
can instill these values and obligations in clinic students. Or perhaps
the economics of legal practice (and legal education) make social jus-
tice lawyering financially unfeasible for most lawyers. Or maybe -
just maybe - the emphasis on skills training in clinical programs has
resulted in too much time being devoted to simulation, performance
critique, and structured reflection, and too little to the ways in which
lawyers can, and should, use law to pursue social justice and stimulate
social reform.
MIRED IN THE SIXTIES
My colleague, Robert Solomon, likes to quote Florence Roisman,
who teaches at Indiana University Law School, when encouraging stu-
dents not to think too narrowly about the possibilities of using law to
solve clients' problems: "If it offends your sense of justice, there's a
cause of action."
We teach our students that just because a particular legal claim
has never been made before does not mean that it won't work. We
urge them to be creative, to be open to the possibility that law can be
used - even in the current judicial climate - to challenge perceived
injustice in the world. We tell them about cases like Brown v. Board
19 See PHILIP G. SCHRAG & MICHAEL MELTSNER, REFLEcnONS ON CLINICAL LEGAL
EDUCATION 16 (1998).
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of Education,20 Habib v. Edwards,21 Goldberg v. Kelly,22 Boddie v.
Connecticut?3 and In re Primus,24 all cases brought by civil rights and
legal services lawyers to establish rights - legal rights - that had not
existed before. We challenge our students to create their own legal
theories and strategies to effect positive social change.
It was just such a challenge from us that led a group of our clinic
students to develop a lawsuit on behalf of nearly 1000 homeless fami-
lies facing eviction from emergency housing because of a 100-day
maximum rule. Through a creative reading of Connecticut statutes
the students developed a legal theory that would bar the state from
terminating emergency housing benefits unless there existed safe, san-
itary, affordable housing for these parents and their children to move
into.
We had read these statutes many times, as had other legal ser-
vices lawyers in the state, but none of us had thought of this interpre-
tation of the statutory language.
The students drafted pleadings, wrote briefs, interviewed clients
(while other students took care of clients' children), prepared and
tried the case, and won a statewide injunction on behalf of all welfare
families residing in emergency housing.
In the meantime, they developed and carried out a public rela-
tions and legislative campaign, writing op-ed pieces for local newspa-
pers, calling press conferences, and lobbying state legislators in an
effort to change existing social policy away from emergency housing
and toward increased rent subsidies for recipients.
The trial court's decision granting the injunction, in which the
judge praised the students' advocacy, was reversed on appeal by the
Connecticut Supreme Court, despite a brilliant argument by one of
the law students, and an outstanding brief written by the group.25
The Connecticut Law Tribune included the Supreme Court's decision
reversing the trial court in its list of the ten worst judicial decisions of
the year.26
But the students had actually won the case. By the time that the
state supreme court reversed the trial court's decision, the students
20 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding public school segregation unconstitutional).
21 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969) (recognizing the
defense of retaliatory eviction).
22 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (requiring hearings prior to termination of welfare benefits).
23 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (requiring state courts to waive filing fees for indigent divorce
plaintiffs).
24 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (upholding the constitutional right of public interest lawyers to
solicit prospective litigants).
25 Savage v. Aronson, 214 Conn. 256, 571 A.2d 696 (1990).
26 CONN. L. TRIB., February 18, 1991, at A9.
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had succeeded in keeping close to 1000 families housed for nearly a
year, and, in the meantime, largely as a result of their advocacy, rent
subsidies or otherwise affordable housing were made available to all
the families affected by the policy.
A similar passion for justice should be at the core of individual
client representation. Two of our students represented a young
mother, first in a Social Security appeal, then in an eviction case, then
in a neglect proceeding when her children were taken away from after
she left them home alone, and finally in criminal cases resulting from
her arrests for stealing in order to support her cocaine habit.
These students befriended the client, driving her to court appear-
ances, arranging for her to enter an inpatient drug treatment program
and driving her there, and listening to and counseling her at all hours
of the day and night, and on weekends.
We encouraged these students in the belief that "representing"
this client meant offering personal and logistical support that might
help her stay out of prison and regain custody of her children. Their
devotion to her inspired the client to "get her act together" and col-
laborate with the students in addressing her problems. By entering a
drug treatment program she avoided incarceration and eventually
regained custody of her children.
A few winters ago some of our students started visiting homeless
people at the New Haven train station, where they had taken refuge
from the cold. The police were threatening to expel the people from
the station, even though the shelters were full and there was no place
for them to go. We encouraged these students to act on their belief
that in order to be "lawyers" for the homeless people in the train
station, lawyers (or law students) needed to be present to argue
against the proposed police action. The students ended up spending
the night at the train station. Through their physical presence, and by
appealing to the individual police officers as human beings, these stu-
dents "won" their "case." The people were allowed to sleep in the
train station, rather than being driven out into the freezing cold streets
of New Haven.
While we do have our successes, we camiot claim to reach every
clinic student. Some students manage not to hear, or to ignore, or
even to resist the social justice message that we believe is implicit (or
even sometimes explicit) in our work. And, like all clinical teachers,
we can be consumed by our teaching, supervising and administrative
duties, often at the expense of maintaining a commitment to the pur-
suit of social justice at the forefront of our work.
A major feature of the Yale clinical program that helps to miti-
gate this problem is the use of a tiered system in which experienced
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students act as junior supervisors.
At Yale, students may begin their clinical experience as early as
their second semester in law school. As a result, second and third-
year students who continue in the program are available to help initi-
ate new students into clinical work, and guide their work along the
way, much as medical residents do for interns and medical students.27
Each advanced student is responsible for assisting in the supervi-
sion of one or more new students. These experienced students pass
on the "tribal lore" of the program; provide information about the
"basics" of clinic operations; offer advice and answer questions about
handling cases; edit first drafts of correspondence, pleadings, motions,
and memoranda; and assist with research, fact investigation, and client
interviews.
Having advanced students serve as "senior associates" not only
stretches the supervisory capability of the clinical faculty, but even
more important, places students in the position of sharing responsibil-
ity for the effective operation of the clinical program, and for the qual-
ity of legal assistance provided to clients by new students.
Giving students such responsibility enables them to develop the
confidence to provide real leadership within the clinical program.
These students serve not only as assistant supervisors, but also as "di-
rectors" in their respective clinics, and as members of the student
board of directors of the entire program.28
Student directors share responsibility with the clinical faculty for
client intake, the classroom curriculum, and clinic organization and
management, in addition to supervision of student casework. In this
way students are able to learn not only how to serve clients, but also
how to run a legal services program. Giving students this responsibil-
ity empowers them to assume responsibility for carrying out the social
justice mission of the clinical program.
It may be unrealistic to believe it possible to replicate in the law
school clinic the passion for challenging injustice, and the feeling of
participating in a struggle for social change, that inspired legal services
and civil rights lawyers in the 1960's. The sense of being part of a
movement for social justice that existed then has departed from our
public life.
27 At Yale students receive three credits for participating in a clinic for a semester,
making it the credit-equivalent of a typical course in the law school. They are permitted to
continue participating in the clinic for credit in succeeding semesters.
28 The Yale clinical program comprises eight individual clinics, each co-taught by two
members of the clinical faculty. Each member of the clinical faculty teaches and supervises
in two clinics. The clinics are: Advocacy for Parents and Children; Advocacy for People
with Disabilities; Advocacy for Prisoners; Community Legal Services; Housing and Com-
munity Development; Immigration; Landlord-Tenant; and Legal Assistance.
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Nevertheless, we who enjoy the luxury of being clinical teachers
- practicing law with students eager to learn, being well-paid to re-
present clients who cannot afford to pay for our services, having the
opportunity to spend "quality time" with our students in seminars and
supervision - have the opportunity to re-create some of that spirit.
Some years ago we invited the student directors of our clinical
program - named "The Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organiza-
tion" ("LSO") in honor of that early advocate of clinical legal educa-
tion29 - to draft a mission statement that would reflect our
educational philosophy. The students came up with a declaration of
principles which they called a "manifesto." It is an example both of
what students can learn from participating in the clinic, and of what
they can bring to the clinic if encouraged to do so.
The clinical program provides a vital space at this law school in
which we as students explore the relationship between legal theory
and practice. It combines the virtues of both classroom and office,
promoting disciplined intellectual inquiry, integrity and excellence
in legal practice, and service to different disadvantaged communi-
ties. Superior teaching distinguishes the clinic from work exper-
iences outside of the law school. Real cases provide a unique
medium for education that differentiates LSO from other programs
of study available elsewhere within the law school.
Conferences between students and faculty to discuss cases pre-
sent opportunities to conduct careful analysis of a variety of legal
materials and to explore a wide diversity of issues that run through-
out the law .... Clinical work lends an immediacy and gravity to
these issues which drives students not only to think hard but also to
do so until they find operative solutions to the particular problems
out of which such issues arise. Students learn that the value of intel-
lectual inquiry resides in the considered adoption of imperfect prac-
tical solutions to real problems, not simply in the clarity and
coherence of analysis. In short, students learn the importance of
good judgment.
Representing clients in the clinical program demands from stu-
dents thoroughness in research as well as precision in verbal and
written presentation of factual scenarios and legal principles. Stu-
dent work must conform to standards of professional integrity and
must vigorously support the interests of clients. Supervised practice
brings discipline to students' exploration of the more theoretical is-
sues involved in casework. Good technical skills promote clarity in
intellectual inquiry and are central to effecting the decisions
29 See Jerome N. Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907
(1933); Jerome N. Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303 (1947). See also
Laura Holland, Invading the Ivory Tower: The History of Clinical Legal Education at Yale
Law School, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 504 (1999).
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reached by students in these inquiries as they represent clients.
At the heart of the education provided by our clinical faculty
stand individual clients and the interests of disadvantaged peoples.
Because of this focus, the clinic provides a unique context in which
to explore the nature of advocacy as a form of service to one's com-
munity. It is a place where we as students have been able to explore
the basic questions of our common calling to the law.3o
Our clinical faculty has been accused by some of our non-clinical
faculty colleagues of being "mired in the sixties." We plan to make
that the logo of our next clinical program T-shirt.
CONCLUSION
From the beginning of the clinical legal education movement, ex-
periential learning and skills-training were seen as the means for
achieving the justice goal articulated by William Pincus, not as ends in
themselves. Clinicians were to offer students the experience of repre-
senting real clients in the real world, but that experience was to pro-
vide the basis for reflecting on and learning about the clients' world,
and the lawyer's role and responsibility. Similarly, clinicians were to
teach skills, but teaching skills was not meant to define who they were
or what they did.
The goal of clinical legal education has never been limited to
skills training. The issue has not been whether clinicians should teach
skills, but what skills do students need to learn, incidental to and in
order to pursue the overriding educational and professional purpose
of the clinic.
The question we as clinical educators need to address is, what is
that overriding purpose? If it is, as I believe, teaching law students
about the ability and responsibility of lawyers to work for justice and
to challenge injustice through the supervised representation of low-
income clients, then we as teachers must infuse the skills we teach
with that overriding purpose.
Similarly, as Jane Aiken has argued,31 clinicians must do more
than simply offer experience to their students. Law students' assump-
tions about the world, and particularly about the world of low-income
clients, are not necessarily correct. It is not enough for clinicians to
provide students the opportunity to look at the real world through the
representation of clients. Clinical teachers must sensitize students to
what they are seeing, guide them to a deeper understanding of their
clients' lives and their relationship to the social, economic and politi-
30 A Manifesto from the LSD Student Board of Directors, Fall 1991 (on file with the
author).
31 Aiken, supra note 14.
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cal forces that affect their lives, and help students develop a critical
consciousness imbued with a concern for social justice.32
Over the years I have often said: "We don't teach skills, we teach
legal theory." What I have sought to express by that admittedly ten-
dentious statement is my deep belief that the primary purpose of
clinical legal education is to teach students that law is not an end in
itself, but a mechanism for pursuing social objectives. Clinical educa-
tion should not be limited to teaching interviewing and counseling,
negotiation and courtroom advocacy, drafting and brief-writing. Do-
ing law cannot, and should not, be reduced to a repertoire of technical
skills. The goal of our teaching should be to teach students to use law
on behalf of clients as a means for pursuing justice and working for
social change.
The goal of faculty-supervised law practice should be to provide
professional education in the public interest, not simply "skills train-
ing." Its overarching pedagogical objectives should be to teach stu-
dents to employ legal skills and legal theory to meet social needs, to
expose students to the ways in which law can work either to advance
or subvert public welfare and social justice, and to inculcate in stu-
dents a professional commitment to using law to address important
social, economic and political issues that affect the rights and legiti-
mate interests of the poor, oppressed and disenfranchised among us.
Milner Ball, who teaches at the University of Georgia, has re-
cently transformed his jurisprudence course into a "Public Interest
Practicum" in which he and his students go into the community and
provide assistance to poor people.
Ball's stated reasons for making this fieldwork a part of his juris-
prudence course are "to identify people's needs and the existing ser-
vices for meeting them, to discover what lawyers can do to help make
connections between needs and services, to recognize gaps and what
lawyers can do to help fill them, and to determine what systemic
changes are in order and how lawyers can initiate them. "33 Ball be-
32 Social work educators have promulgated a curriculum standard on the "promotion
of social and economic justice":
Programs of social work education must provide an understanding of the dy-
namics and consequences of social and economic injustice, including all forms of
human oppression and discrimination. They must provide students with the skills to
promote social change and to implement a wide range of interventions that further
the achievement of individual and collective social and economic justice. Theoretical
and practice content must be provided about strategies of intervention for achieving
social and economic justice and combating causes and effects of institutionalized
forms of oppression.
COUNCIL ON SOCIAL WORK EDUCATION, PROMOTION OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE
(1994) (Curriculum Policy Statement).
33 Milner Ball, Jurisprudence from Below: First Notes (unpublished manuscript on file
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lieves that the fieldwork may generate answers to some basic ques-
tions in jurisprudence: What is law? What functions can law serve in
society? What is the role of the lawyer?
Ball has also changed the reading that students do. Instead of
confining the course to classics of jurisprudence, students read Greek
tragedy, the Hebrew bible, Icelandic sagas, Shakespeare, Black Elk
Speaks, and Billy Budd, and discover connections between the large
moral issues raised in those works and the large moral issues they en-
counter in working with the poor.
Ball says that the goal of his clinical teaching is not to provide
"skills training," but to press students to ask, "as appropriately juris-
prudential questions ... : 'Who am I as a lawyer?' and 'What am I
doing when I do law?'"
Legal education - and especially clinical legal education -
properly understood, should have a political and moral purpose that
informs its intellectual and skills-training functions. It should not be
limited to the acquisition of legal knowledge and the development of
professional skills, although both of those are essential.
A story is told of a Hasidic Rabbi in a Polish shtetl accosted one
evening by a sentry, who demands: "Who are you, and what is your
business?" The rabbi inquires of the sentry, "How much do they pay
you to do this?" "Five zlotys a week," replies the sentry. "Then I will
pay you ten zlotys a week if you will work for me," says the rabbi.
"What do I have to do?," asks the sentry, incredulously. "Whenever
you see me," replies the Hasid, "I want you to stop me and ask me,
'Who are you, and what is your business?'"
We who are clinical teachers must be our own sentries and con-
tinually ask ourselves, paraphrasing Milner Ball, "Who am I as a law
teacher? What am I doing when I teach law?"
with the author).
